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Popular Government Spring 1993
<br />http: // ncinfo. iog .unc.edu /planning/pgsp93.htm
<br />13. Note that a zoning text change that substantially changes the range of permitted uses in a district can
<br />have the same practical effect as a map change and in those instances may be covered.
<br />14. Many of the modifications are of only temporary duration. This trend of local modification is
<br />continuing. Some thirteen bills were introduced in the 1993 General Assembly to provide mailed -notice
<br />exceptions to thirty-three local governments. A bill is also pending that would extend these alternatives
<br />to mailed notice to all local governments.
<br />15. Freeland v. Orange County, 273 N.C. 452, 160 S.E.2d 282 (1968).
<br />16. Freeland, 273 N.C. at 457, 160 S.E.2d at 286.
<br />17. Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C. 506, 518, 178 S.E.2d 352, 359 -60 (1971)
<br />18. Heaton, 277 N.C. at 518 -19, 178 S.E.2d at 360. See also Walker v. Town of Elkin, 254 N.C. 85, 118
<br />S.E.2d 1 (1960); In re Issuance of CAMA Permit to Worthy, 82 N.C. App. 32, 345 S.E.2d 699 (1986).
<br />19. Also, G.S. 160A- 71(b1) provides that regular and special meetings of the governing board may be
<br />recessed or adjourned to reconvene at a time and place certain (the comparable county provision, G.S.
<br />153A -40, contains a similar provision for regular county board meetings). G.S. 143- 318.12(b)(1) in the
<br />state's open meetings law provides that if the time and place for reconvening are set in the properly
<br />noticed original meeting, no additional public notice is required.
<br />20. See George v. Town of Edenton, 294 N.C. 679,242 S.E.2d 877 (1978); Nelson v. City of
<br />Burlington, 80 N.C. App. 285, 341 S.E.2d 739 (1986); Clark v. City of Charlotte, 66 N.C. App. 437, 311
<br />S.E.2d 71 (1984).
<br />21. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974); Jarrell v.
<br />Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476,128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
<br />22. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 284 N.C. at 470, 202 S.E.2d at 137 (citations omitted)..
<br />23. See, e.g., Jarrell, 258 N.C. at 476, 128 S.E.2d at 879; Brummer v. Board of Adjustment, 81 N.C.
<br />App. 307,343 S.E.2d 603, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 413, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
<br />24. Craver v. Board of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 40, 147 S.E.2d 599 (1966); Burton v. New Hanover
<br />County Board of Adjustment, 49 N.C. App. 439, 271.S.E.2d 550, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 217, 276 S.E.2d
<br />914 (1981); Carter v. Town of Chapel Hill, 14 N.C. App. 93, 187 S.E.2d 588, cent. denied, 281 N.C.
<br />314,188 S.E.2d 897 (1972).
<br />25. Robinhood Trails Neighbors v. Board of Adjustment, 44 N.C. App. 539, 261 S.E.2d 520, cent.
<br />denied, 299 N.C. 737,267 S.E.2d 663 (1980). See also Rule 5.2, Rules of Professional Conduct of the
<br />North Carolina State. Bar. This rule prohibits a lawyer from testifying as a witness in a case he or she is
<br />handling unless the testimony relates solely to an uncontested matter, is related to legal fees, or if refusal
<br />to testify would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer in
<br />the particular case.
<br />26. A standard oath may be used, such as, "Do you swear (or affirm) that the evidence you give shall be
<br />the truth,. the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?"
<br />27. Crump v. Board of Education, 326 N.C. 603, 392 S.E.2d 579 (1990). It is important to distinguish
<br />personal knowledge, which can be considered if disclosed, from personal bias, which disqualifies a
<br />member from participation. Personal bias is present if the member has a fixed opinion that is not
<br />susceptible to change regardless of the evidence presented. Also, in Rice Assoc. v. Town of Weaverville
<br />Bd. of Adjustment, 108 N.C. App. 346, 423 S.E.2d 519 (1992), the court held that participation of a
<br />member with bias does not invalidate the decision if the applicant is not entitled to a permit under any
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