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Agenda - 10-03-2005-WS1
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Agenda - 10-03-2005-WS1
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BOCC
Date
10/3/2005
Document Type
Agenda
Agenda Item
WS1
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5 <br />Executive Summary <br />The terrorist attacks of Fall 2001 illustrated to the nation the vulnerability of our citizenry <br />to attack. The investigations that followed showed emergency management communities that <br />local and state agencies might not have the personnel or the equipment required for response to a <br />mass casualty event or a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Though the results were extremely <br />horrifying and disturbing, the effects could have been much, much worse. Had the attacks been <br />more virulent or widespread, the effects may have resulted in the crippling of further response <br />and the possible destabilization of the United States.. <br />This study is examines current response and preparedness situations along the Interstate - <br />40/85 corridor in North Carolina. The study examines potential threats, targets and limiting <br />response factors. Additionally, policies of evacuation and quarantine are examined, providing <br />identification of mitigating factors. This study identifies that: <br />Counties along the Interstate -40/85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed <br />space available to triage and treat WMD events within the first week of a <br />catastrophic event. <br />Total evacuation of counties within one week in the study area is possible, but is <br />not likely to occur within 24 hours. <br />Large -scale quarantines will not work for large dispersed rural areas or heavily <br />populated urban areas, <br />Berl Space <br />Table 1 Study area licensed beds measured in potential casualties identified and treated within one week <br />Response Asset <br />County <br />Licensed Beds <br />Potential Casualties <br />Treated <br />Beds <br />Orange <br />578 Licensed Beds <br />578 <br />Durham <br />1,294 Licensed Beds <br />1,294 <br />Wake <br />1,203 Licensed Beds <br />1,203 <br />Chatham <br />68 Licensed Beds <br />68 <br />Alamance <br />182 Licensed Beds <br />182 <br />Guilford <br />291 Licensed Beds <br />291 <br />Johnston <br />160 Licensed Beds <br />160 <br />Total <br />3,776 Licensed Beds <br />3,776 <br />Counties along the Interstate -40/85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed <br />space available to triage and treat VVMD events within the first week. A WMD event will <br />infect hundreds if not thousands, and affect thousands if not tens of thousands. For every actual <br />casualty identified, there will also be multiple others convinced that they have been infected or <br />exposed and that they are facing imminent death. Without the ability to immediately diagnose <br />potential patients, hospitals and care centers will be forced to house and process all patients that <br />present signs or complain of'symptoms. <br />
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