Agenda - 04-29-2003-1 - Laserfiche WebLink

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Executive Summary The terrorist attacks of Fa112001 illustrated to the nation the vulnerability of our citizenry to attack. The investigations that followed showed emergency management communities that local and state agencies might not have the personnel or the equipment required for response to a mass casualty event or a weapon of mass destruction (WNID). Though the results were extremely horrifying and disturbing, the effects could have been much, much worse. Had the attacks been more virulent or widespread, the effects may have resulted in the crippling of further response and the possible destabilization of the United States. This study is examines current response and preparedness situations along the Interstate- 40/85 corridor in North Carolina. The study examines potential threats, targets and limiting response factors. Additionally, policies of evacuation and quarantine are examined, providing identification of mitigating factors. This study identifies that: ^ Counties along the Interstate-40%85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed space available to triage and treat WMD events within the first week of a catastrophic event. ^ Total evacuation of counties within one week in the study area is possible, but is not likely to occur within 24 hours. ^ Large-scale quarantines will not work for large dispersed rural areas or heavily populated urban areas. Bed Snace Table 1 Study area licensed beds measured in potential casualties identified and treated within one week Response Asset County Licensed Beds Potential Casualties Treated Beds Oran a 578 Licensed Beds 578 Durham 1,294 Licensed Beds 1,294 Wake 1,203 Licensed Beds 1,203 Chatham 68 Licensed Beds 68 Alamance 182 Licensed Beds 182 Guilford 291 Licensed Beds 291 Johnston 160 Licensed Beds 160 Total 3,776 Licensed Beds 3,776 Counties along the Interstate-40/85 corridor do not have adequate licensed bed space available to triage and treat WMD events within the first week. A WMD event will infect hundreds if not thousands, and affect thousands if not tens of thousands. For every actual casualty identified, there will also be multiple others convinced that they have been infected or exposed and that they are facing imminent death. Without the ability to immediately diagnose potential patients, hospitals and care centers will be forced to house and process all patients that present signs or complain of symptoms.