Agenda - 05-02-2002 - Agenda - Laserfiche WebLink

Browse Search

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS FROM AUDIENCE Public Forum on Nuclear Terrorism in the Triangle May 2, 2002 Below is a compilation of the questions which were submitted at the May 2, 2002 Symposium. County Staff, NC Warn, Emergency Management and other experts in the field have answered these questions. However, questions dealing with policy issues were not answered but will be considered by the Board of County Commissioners. On behalf of the Orange County Board of County Commissioners we want to take this opportunity to thank you for your attendance and hope that this symposium will lead to a greater understanding that planning for a possible terrorism attack must be done regionally. O. What good will it do to "stockpile" potassium iodide? Doesn't it need to be distributed before an accident to be truly effective? A. Correct. It should be in the possession of each person/family potentially exposed to radiation from a nuclear facility. The NRC recommends a 10-mile radius. Others believe it should be a much larger area. O. If the current storage technique is dangerous, then what difference does it make if there is twice as much waste fuel? In other words, why should we be concerned about the size of the storage at Shearon Harris, due to the transfer from other plants? A. There is concern that the more spent fuel assemblies stored at Shearon Harris, the more attractive the plant might be as a potential target. Also, the more waste in the pools, the larger the potential release if an attack, or accident, caused loss of water resulting in a fire. O. I feel the only protection for nuclear power plants from an air attack would be anti-aircraft guns, as used in France. These would have to be manned by trained National Guard or army personnel. Will there be anything done about standardizing (having) that for all plants? Our taxes would have to pay for the protection, another government subsidy for nuclear energy. A. The Union of Concerned Scientists is examining a different answer, passive defenses. Anti- aircraft missiles or guns have three problems: (1) unless complemented by large no-fly zones, anti-aircraft defenses lack sufficient warning time of errant planes to be effective; (2) antFaircraft missiles or guns could shoot down an innocent airliner straying off course due to mistake or weather; and (3) anti-aircraft missiles or guns could be taken over and used to attack the plant. The Union of Concerned Scientists is working with a couple of civil engineers on passive defenses. For example, tall Fbeams anchored in concrete and braced by angle iron could be linked by steel cables to form a very tall fence-like barrier around the plant or at least its vulnerable sides. If necessary, two rows of these barriers could be erected. The idea would be to stop small aircraft and slow/break-up larger aircraft so they don't penetrate into plant buildings. The advantages of the passive barriers are that they cannot be turned and used as a weapon against the plant and once erected, it's less likely that lack of funding down the road will cause them to be removed (as in the case ofanti-aircraft weapons)