<br />
<br />NORTH CAROLINA POVERTY RESEARCH FUND 15
<br />Court Fines and Fees: Criminalizing Poverty in North Carolina
<br />hundreds of people are held at the Mecklenburg County Jail for failure to pay fines or fees in connection
<br />to their criminal convictions.78 To make Bearden meaningful, courts should also examine a defendant’s
<br />ability to pay at sentencing, when contemplating the assessment of fees and fines, rather than waiting until
<br />failure to pay the imposed obligation. Fundamental notions of due process of law, at a minimum, demand
<br />notice to the defendant of the centrality of ability to pay to the punishment determination and an
<br />opportunity to explain financial exigency and hardship. Many courts in North Carolina fail to meet such a
<br />basic standard.
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<br />Third, even without directly triggered incarceration, substantial fees and court-imposed financial
<br />obligations can impermissibly burden the constitutional rights and interests of low income defendants.
<br />North Carolina law, for example, indicates a $250 community service fee “shall be paid by all persons
<br />who participate in the program or receive services from the program staff.”79 This important alternative to
<br />harsher sanction can thus be foreclosed to those unable to pay the daunting charge, effectively denying
<br />equal protection under law and penalizing defendants for their poverty. The installment fee, pre-trial
<br />release fee, probation fee, home monitoring fee, expunction fee, failure to pay fee, and others, in
<br />operation, similarly discriminate potently against poor North Carolinians without constitutional
<br />justification—closing doors, opportunities, programs and potential benefits based on income status.
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<br />An even larger array of costs and fees directly burden the exercise of explicit constitutional rights. The
<br />fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution assure rights of due process, jury trial,
<br />witness confrontation and assistance of counsel. Fees for bail, court facilities, state crime lab work, state
<br />lab analysts, and the general use of the court system can burden the exercise of such constitutionally
<br />secured rights in ways that fall very disproportionally upon poor Tar Heels. Perhaps most invidious,
<br />North Carolina General Statute § 7A-455.1 imposes a mandatory appointment fee on (already
<br />determined) indigent defendants who request counsel. National reports suggest that “poor people
<br />sometimes skip using an attorney” to avoid legally assessed financial obligations.80 Our North Carolina
<br />court observations and interviews with criminal defendants, judges and public defenders indicate that
<br />poor defendants refuse appointed (constitutionally-mandated) counsel out of fear of judicially-imposed
<br />fees and the sanctions that accompany them. This makes a mockery of the landmark decision in Gideon v.
<br />Wainwright.
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<br />Fourth, North Carolina, as indicated, has an unusually long list of user fees in criminal cases. It joins that
<br />burgeoning lineup with what is likely the nation’s most aggressive scheme to restrict the judicial waivers
<br />that are necessary to assure that poor people aren’t punished criminally for their poverty. In 2011, the
<br />North Carolina General Assembly moved to limit traditional judicial discretion to waive economically
<br />burdensome fees by requiring “a written finding of just cause” before any waiver can be issued. The next
<br />year, 2012, the requirement was expanded to demand “findings of fact and conclusions of law” to support
<br />the determination. Then, in 2014, legislators took the path-breaking step of requiring the state’s
<br />Administrative Office of the Courts to issue an annual report, outlining by court and individual judge,
<br />how many times fees and fines have been waived—a report many judges describe as a legislative
<br />“shaming” effort. Then, in 2017, yet another restriction was passed demanding that courts provide a 15-
<br />day notice and opportunity to be heard to an array of government and quasi-governmental agencies—615
<br />in all—that stand to receive a portion of the fines and fees under consideration to be waived.81
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<br />In response, Mecklenburg Chief District Court Judge Regan Miller remarked, “It’s clear that the provision
<br />is designed to make the process so cumbersome that judges will elect to not waive costs.”82 Judge Pat
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<br />78 Gordon, “His Sentence Carried No Jail Time. So Why Did He Keep Ending Up There?”
<br />79 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-708(c).
<br />80 Shapiro, “As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price.” See Diller, Bannon, and Nagrecha, Criminal Justice Debt, 12.
<br />81 Schofield, “This Is What Government Looks Like When You Run It on the Cheap.”
<br />82 Boughton, “House and Senate Differ Over Budget Provision Making It Harder for Judges to Waive Fees for Poor Defendants.”
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