Orange County NC Website
looks like, how it’s built… If Bill Gate buys the farm, some land, and starts trying to do agriculture he can 1 <br />put a taj mahal barn on it if he wants to. Until that barn starts getting used in a way that is non-farm he is 2 <br />permitted to build that barn. And that’s what we’re talking about today. A building permit that was issued 3 <br />without being subject to zoning. So my first submission to this Board is that you lack the jurisdiction at this 4 <br />point to make a decision as to future uses on this site. It is clear, both in Ms. Brewer’s affidavit and in the 5 <br />email, which is being appealed, that the County will continue to assess the uses that are occurring on that 6 <br />property. Turning to the estoppel argument. Ms. Brown raised the Marsh case. I would submit first of all, 7 <br />there is a jurisdictional issue here as well in that… The power to rule on estoppel claim is an equitable 8 <br />power that this Board does not have. 9 <br /> 10 <br />Barry Katz: Equitable? 11 <br /> 12 <br />Andy Petesch: An equitable power. 13 <br /> 14 <br />Barry Katz: Court? 15 <br /> 16 <br />Andy Petesch: Yes. That is conferred on our trial courts but the authority of this Board is set out in (North 17 <br />Carolina General Statute) 160a-388. Again, made applicable to counties through a separate statute. And 18 <br />that is your powers are to rule on SUP, Conditional Use Permits, variances, and appeals from staff 19 <br />determinations. From final and binding determinations. It does not include ruling on an estoppel claim. That 20 <br />aside, Ms. Brown’s heavy reliance on the Marsh case communicated that the facts were very similar and it 21 <br />should apply here are misplaced. In Marsh what happened is that the gentleman had some land, he was 22 <br />doing some farming on it, he wanted to run a rodeo. He wanted to have rodeo events. And he applied for a 23 <br />SUP and he was granted that SUP. The conditions included, among other, he would only have 1 access, 24 <br />not two accesses to the rodeo events and that he would only have 4 rodeos a year. He violated. He 25 <br />exceeded the 4-rodeo limit and then also created a second access. So the jurisdiction then issued notices 26 <br />of violation and then the staff went to the Board Of Adjustment on their own and requested that the SUP be 27 <br />revoked. The Board of Adjustment then did revoke the SUP and then the owner appealed that to Superior 28 <br />Court and in their appeal he had spent all 5 pages of his brief arguing and claiming the reason why 29 <br />inaudible shouldn’t matter is that he was exempt under 153a-340. And then the Superior Court ruled 30 <br />against him, affirmed the revocation and in doing so said one of the basises was that he was estopped 31 <br />because he had been granted a SUP and now he was challenges that approval. Something that he had 32 <br />received. And so he did not appeal that decision. So he went on to continue to operate rodeos. He was 33 <br />issued additional notice of violations, he appealed that and it went on to the Superior Court. They held that 34 <br />because he did not appeal that he had his chance, made his argument about the exemption, and then 35 <br />didn’t appeal that and then couldn’t come back and claim the exemption again. That’s not at all what 36 <br />happened here. There was no approval granted in the beginning. And in the process Ms. Brewer never 37 <br />tried to challenge the fact that… She never raised the exemption issue. In fact, when she asked for the 38 <br />exemption to be approved and to be able to go forward under the exemption it was granted by staff. She’s 39 <br />not been issued any notice of violations. So for estoppel to apply, especially they type of estoppel called 40 <br />collateral estoppel that was identified by the Court in Marsh, this issue that you’re trying to be estopped 41 <br />from claiming in this case that you qualify for the exemption. That has had to have been heard and litigated 42 <br />before and a decision made on it, in order for estoppel to apply. If that issue has never been raised and 43 <br />heard by a judicial body, and decided, then estoppel isn’t applicable. So that reliance on the Marsh case 44 <br />and the entire estoppel argument here completely fails because this is the first time that Ms. Brewer has 45 <br />sought approval under the exemption. And I will specifically ask you to turn your attention to the Special 46 <br />Use Agenda abstract. This is for case A2-15, heard on November 9th 2015. So what was introduced by the 47 <br />applicants as a staff report? They’re exhibit number 8. I’ll read the relevant sections quickly. This is on page 48 <br />95