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20 <br />For instance, any pharmacy order which exceeds 10% of the prior month's order would be <br />considered a "suspicious order." 5 <br />The information in the ARCOS database is confidential. The public has never seen the data <br />related to the volume of prescription opiates distributed in each community. That changed when a <br />journalist from the Charleston Gazette gained access to records sealed in a lawsuit filed by the West <br />Virginia Attorney General against the wholesale distributors. The data revealed that 780 million <br />prescription opiates were distributed in West Virginia (population 1.8 million) during a six -year <br />window of time. The journalist, Eric Eyre, recently won the Pulitzer Prize for his investigative <br />journalism. <br />Cities and counties have the ability through local law enforcement and cooperation with the <br />DEA to seek and obtain historical ARCOS data. Because this information contains a record of <br />every order filled by each pharmaceutical distributor, a review of those orders would allow for a <br />determination of how many suspicious orders were not flagged by the distributors. <br />This lack of real -time monitoring and reporting by the distributors stripped cities, counties <br />and the DEA of their ability to timely identify, investigate, and prevent the diversion of the highly <br />addictive drugs at issue. <br />E. The Duty to Report Suspicious Orders Extends to Opioid Manufacturers <br />In July of this year, the DEA for the first time sanctioned an opioid manufacturer for failing <br />to report suspicious opioid orders. Pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between <br />manufacturer Mallinckrodt and the DEA, Mallinckrodt paid a $35 million civil penalty for violating <br />federal laws that mandate suspicious order reporting. <br />Specifically, Mallinckrodt was operating what is known in the industry as a "chargeback" <br />system. Mallinckrodt sold opioids to a wholesale distributor at a higher than usual price, and then <br />offered the distributor a substantial rebate in exchange for the distributor's downstream customer <br />sales information or "chargeback data ". This chargeback data allows manufacturers, like <br />Mallinckrodt, to obtain knowledge of suspicious opioid orders. Manufacturers of controlled <br />substances are under the same legal obligations as distributors to prevent drug diversion and are <br />similarly required to notify DEA of suspicious orders received from their customers. The <br />Mallinckrodt -DEA agreement requires that manufacturers review chargebacks and other data and <br />report suspicious orders in underlying sales from distributors to downstream customers. <br />The "chargeback" system is not unique to Mallinckrodt. Our investigation has discovered <br />that this practice is widespread throughout the industry, and that manufacturers have embraced <br />shipping suspicious orders of opioids as an integral part of their business model. Therefore, <br />5 See Southwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 FR 36487 (2007); Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 203 <br />(D.D.C. 2012). <br />5 <br />