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Agenda - 03-21-1990
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Agenda - 03-21-1990
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BOCC
Date
3/21/1990
Meeting Type
Regular Meeting
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Agenda
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158 LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENT [14] <br /> buyers of housing to be linked with quality and prestige. Suffice <br /> it to say that cause-and-effect predictions about housing markets <br /> are about as reliable as cause-and-effect predictions about the <br /> stock market. <br /> There are a number of theories and countertheories in the <br /> economic literature purporting to explain how, in an economic <br /> model, an economist might determine who bears the economic <br /> incidence of a tax or regulation which, as discussed earlier, may <br /> depend on achieving a perfect understanding of pricing and its <br /> relationship to cost. Economists generally agree that any factor <br /> that affects costs may be passed on to the consumer; and/or the <br /> landowner, and/or the builder, and/or the suppliers of labor or <br /> materials, depending on the elasticities of supply and demand- <br /> . <br /> and the agreement stops right there. A majority of economists <br /> would probably disagree with anyone who purported to have an <br /> understanding of the housing market sufficiently exact to tell <br /> who and in what proportion the various participants in the hous- <br /> ing market might be expected to pay the costs associated with <br /> any particular inclusionary mechanism. <br /> The incidence problem is particularly frustrating in light of the <br /> fact that both set-aside proponents and opponents base their <br /> support on, or opposition to, their particular conclusions as to <br /> who ultimately pays and their views of the equities of that <br /> situation. <br /> Most economists, builders, and social planners agree, how- <br /> ever, that any regulatory system that drives up builder costs in a <br /> housing market area will certainly result in an increase in hous- <br /> ing <br /> prices for market home buyers in that area. The agreement <br /> will be less general about whether a regulatory mechanism that <br /> limits profits on a segment of the housing product will also drive <br /> up costs. <br /> These questions are relevant because in New Jersey the in- <br /> clusionary rule, which requires that housing be delivered, in <br /> some areas, for as little as $20,000 a unit, probably results in <br /> .outright builder losses equal to the amount his costs exceed the <br /> price allowed him in the specific ordinance. In Orange County, <br /> where dwelling units priced between $72,000 and $95,000 qual- <br /> ify, presumably the builder is losing only "profits." A loss of <br /> profits, however, deprives that builder of all or a portion of that <br /> reward the Orange County housing market would otherwise pay <br /> for that builder's initiative, organizational abilities, and willing- <br /> ness to risk capital. <br />
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