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Agenda - 03-29-2007-
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Agenda - 03-29-2007-
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4/23/2013 9:11:58 AM
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8/28/2008 11:32:27 AM
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BOCC
Date
3/29/2007
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Agenda
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Minutes - 20070329
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\Board of County Commissioners\Minutes - Approved\2000's\2007
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THIS study performed by non -NRC researchers after 9/11 shows that nuclear power plants are vulnerable to <br />attack. More importantly, it provides insights into how the NRC dismissed the threat through reliance on <br />secret, non- botulding analyses. <br />All these studies, and many more like therm, strongly suggest that nuclear power plants are vulnerable to <br />aircraft attack. Maybe the NRC Chairman does have secret paper studies prepared behind closed doors with <br />industry representatives that reverse several decades of public studies to show that once vulnerable facilities <br />have been magically transformed into invulnerable fortresses. Or maybe the NRC Chairman has secret <br />studies showing that the facilities are robust and provide adequate protection against attacks by paper <br />airplanes. <br />NRC Chairman HIein's second sentence: "The NRC has also taken actions that require nuclear power <br />plant operators to be able to manage large fires or explosions — no matter what caused then." <br />[Lochbaum] What actions might those be? Certainly not any of these recent actions: <br />In April 2006, the NRC published in the Federal Register its cockamamie scheme to allow nuclear plant <br />owners to continue operating their reactors with known and emerging violations of fire protection regulations <br />now and well into the future with complete immunity from sanctions. <br />Licensees may adopt the performance -based [regulatory] option in 10 CFR 50.48(c).... The NRC will <br />exercise enforcement discretion for existing noncompliance that could reasonably be corrected under 10 <br />CFR 50.48(c). For those noncompliances identified during the licensee's transition process, this enforcement <br />discretion policy will be in. effect for up to 3 years.... In addition to the 3-year discretion period, the staff <br />may grant additional extensions to the discretion policy time for a specific plant item(s) with adequate <br />justification. <br />In other words, NRC inspections have revealed many nuclear plants in violation of longstanding fire <br />protection regulations. The NRC ordered plant owners to resolve these violations years ago, but little <br />progress has been made. The NRC gave the lagging owners more time and waived any thoughts about <br />sanctions for their scoffing at safety regulations.... <br />SO, the NRC is allowing "nuclear power plant operators to be able to manage large fires or explosions" by <br />granting them indefinite "get out of jail free cards" for kriown violations of fire protection regulations.... <br />SO, the NRC is allowing "nuclear power plant owners to be able to manage large fires or explosions" that <br />might introduce large amounts of very combustible jet fuel by granting them permanent exemptions to fire <br />regulations based in large part on small amoturts of combustible materials being present. <br />The fire protection regulations (even if met and non - exempted) are intended to deal with a single fire in a <br />single room or area. No other equipment damage is presumed to occur, other than the components within <br />that room or area damaged by the single fire itself. Will those fire protection regulations ... prove adequate <br />to deal with fires in multiple rooms and areas that can easily result from an aircraft crash? Will, for example, <br />the installed fire sprinklers be able to discharge sufficient water to all the affected areas, despite rupture of <br />one or more fire headers caused by the aircraft impact? <br />3 <br />
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