Orange County NC Website
054 <br /> Mr. Marvin Collins <br /> Page 2 <br /> March 7 ; 1995 <br /> the application stage. On the other hand, although the applicant <br /> can be required to show in general that the use will maintain or <br /> promote the public health, safety and general welfare, the <br /> applicant cannot be expected to anticipate every specific health, <br /> safety and welfare problem. Proof of any such specific problem <br /> should be the responsibility of opponents . <br /> The best statement of the principles involved here is that <br /> contained in Brough & Green, The Zoning Board of Adjustment, at <br /> pages 83-84 ( 2nd ed. Institute of Government, UNC-CH, 1984 ) . <br /> These principles were recognized and approved in a recent North <br /> Carolina Court of Appeals case, Signorelli v. Town of Highland, <br /> 93 N.C.App. 704, 379 S .E . 2d 55 ( 1989) . in that case, the <br /> applicant sought a special use permit. The permit -was denied and <br /> the Superior Court affirmed on the basis that the "petitioner <br /> failed to meet the burden of producing evidence and the burden of <br /> persuasion to allow the board to find in the petitioner's favor. " <br /> 379 S.E. 2d at 57 . The Court of Appeals ' decision affirming the <br /> Superior Court in Signorelli contains the first explicit <br /> recognition in North Carolina case law that "the evidentiary <br /> burden in special use permit proceedings can shift from the <br /> applicant to those who oppose the application. " Id. <br /> The Signorelli case is interesting also for its recognition <br /> that the applicant has some burden on the issue of public health, <br /> safety and general welfare, notwithstanding the caution on that <br /> point in the passage from the Brough and Green publication set <br /> out above . The Signorelli court concluded that the applicant had <br /> established a prima facie case because his application <br /> demonstrated compliance with the relevant specific requirements <br /> and therefore the question was whether the burden of showing that <br /> the proposed use would materially endanger the public health and <br /> safety had been met. The court stated that there was evidence <br /> that the plans were not specific enough for the board to properly <br /> decide whether or not the proposed use would materially endanger <br /> the public health and safety. In particular, the court noted <br /> that the board had found that: <br /> . . .no set of plans or specifics were submitted regarding <br /> hours of operation, number of machines and tables, or <br /> methods of supervision so that protection of the public <br /> welfare against traffic and noise difficulties was not <br /> assured. <br /> 379 S . E. 2d at 58 . The court then concluded that "a plan <br /> lacking in essential details and specifics potentially threatens <br /> health and safety no less than a detailed plan which is <br /> antithetical to the public and the public interest. " Id. , 379 <br /> S .E . 2d at 59 . In other words, the evidence before the board on <br />