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Dr. Thompson did not recall the licensing requirement, but he believes it is five years or less. <br />This means that there would be ample space in the Harris pools to store fuel at low density while it <br />cools down. <br />In your risk assessment, does it include earthquake, terrorism, weather conditions, <br />and loss of water in the cooling plant? <br />Dr. Thompson said that the licensing board would not listen to any discussion about sabotage <br />or terrorism. The probability number does account for earthquakes and severe weather. <br />Just this year, two nuclear plants in the United States lost cooling pools for two days <br />undetected. Isn't there a law at the industry that says that this cannot happen? <br />Dr. Thompson said that the regulatory structure that was built up under the Atomic Energy <br />Act was predicated on the assumption that severe accidents would not occur. The industry <br />objected every time actions were taken to account for the possibility that severe accidents would <br />occur. The industry has come to the state where it does have some recognition of the possibility of <br />severe accidents. He said that there were frequent events called precursor events where some <br />equipment is unavailable or an error is made that, if continued for a longer interval or followed by <br />another event could cause a severe accident. <br />A few weeks ago a waste pool in Iowa lost its cooling pump. Why wasn't there serious <br />radiation released then, and does an incident like this around the country occur, and what <br />does it mean for storage of the same type at Shearon Harris? <br />Dr. Thompson said that this event would be a precursor event. <br />Could you speak to the difference that the NRC has in regulating power plants <br />opposed to regulating the pools? <br />Dr. Thompson said that in the past four decades, the NRC was very reluctant to admit the <br />passibility of reactor accidents. Finally, they were forced to do so, and the occurrence of such an <br />accident got their attention. The staff is denying and resisting again the probability of pool <br />accidents. History shows that it is only through relentless efforts by citizens that these issues <br />receive any attention. <br />Could you speak to dry storage in terms of its relative safety to storing in pools, the <br />long-term implications, and the cast? <br />Dr. Thompson said that dry storage, if properly conducted (according to current regulations), <br />will not cause a fire in the fuel under any scenario other than a direct attack on a cask or a volt. <br />This direct attack could be by an individual or through some military means. An unfortunate <br />feature of dry storage technology is that it is licensed only fora 20-year period. It is passible that <br />dry storage would be needed far 100 years or more. <br />Commissioner Brown then asked anyone from the audience to come and ask further <br />questions. <br />Pete McDowell from Orange County said that when Mr. Lochbaum was here, he answered a <br />question about the susceptibility of the pool storage building to hurricanes and tornadoes by saying <br />that it had not really been studied and that there were some questions. He asked for Dr. <br />Thompson's comment on this. <br />Dr. Thompson said that he had not made any personal study of the vulnerability of Harris <br />structures to earthquake, hurricane, or tornado. From his tour of the plant he can say that it is <br />quite a strongly built structure. He said that the building did have to meet certain design <br />specifications. He said that it was not passible for any individual to answer every question about a <br />big facility like this. <br />Wells Ettleman, staff scientist with North Carolina Citizen's Research Group in Durham, said <br />that the licensing board asked Orange County and its experts to comment on the report of the <br />Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that came out this spring. The report looked like a <br />laundry list of things that could go wrong that the NRC staff had never looked at or ignored. He <br />asked Dr. Thompson to comment on some of the problems that the ACRS raised, particularly the <br />passibility of a thermal runaway reaction at a much lower temperature than is necessary to cause a <br />