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will not, for the next several years, load any more fuel into pools C & D. In subsequent years, the
<br />company anticipates that it will upgrade, in some, as yet, unspecified manner, the component cooling
<br />water system for unit one. The NRC is being asked to approve expansion of pools C & D, when no plan
<br />has been put forth as to how the fuel would be cooled. The company's plan includes two measures of
<br />administrative decisions. First, the heat mode will be kept below one million BTUs per hour. Second,
<br />only fuel with a very long period of exposure in the reactor will be put into these pools.
<br />There is a great deal of hazardous materials in these pools. He made reference to the Chernobyl
<br />accident of 1986, when approximately 27 kilograms of this material was released. There are still
<br />restrictions on selling lamb grown in certain hills of North Wales, and reindeer meat in Sweden, and
<br />various other parts of Europe, because of the material that was distributed worldwide. It is estimated that
<br />the 27 kilograms will cause between 50,000 to 100,000 fatalities worldwide over the next 70 years.
<br />Dr. Thompson then explained how the material gets out. If water is lost from the pool,
<br />the fuel heats up. He explained that partial water loss is actually more severe than total water loss. It
<br />has to do with the circulation of air around the fuel. Residual water in the base of the pool will actually
<br />suppress the circulation and is a more severe problem. He explained what might cause loss of water. A
<br />breach of the pool could cause drainage so that the fuel would be uncovered. If cooling is interrupted for
<br />a period of days, the water would boil and evaporate. There is a ten day interval between a reactor
<br />accident and a pool accident. He showed a picture of the land that would be contaminated by cesium. It
<br />would produce an increase in cancer rates in the range of 7 or 8% above normal incidence. A large area
<br />of land contamination would be a very dramatic event. A large reactor accident at Harris would cause the
<br />whole state of North Carolina to be abandoned. The probability of this happening is, at the very least,
<br />one in 100,000 years.
<br />He explained the available options, such as dry storage installation. These are available
<br />from a number of vendors. They are pre licensed by the NRC, and a number of facilities are using dry
<br />storage. He said that it is obvious that the Harris plant is pursuing the cheaper option. There is no other
<br />explanation for this course of action. Orange County has intervened on this case, and contentions were
<br />filed on behalf of Orange County on Monday of this week. There will be a pre-hearing conference in
<br />North Carolina on May 13. They will rule if some of the contentions warrant a hearing. If so, a hearing
<br />will be held and each side will be heard.
<br />David Lochbaum made reference to the risk factor of one accident in 100,000 years that
<br />Dr. Thompson referred to, and said that in 2400 reactor years, we have had two meltdowns. This data
<br />was excluded when they did these risk assessments.
<br />Mr. Lochbaum then stated the concerns of the UCS, outlined in his handout. The first
<br />concern is that CP&L claims that the proposed activity has no significant increase in the probability of an
<br />accident. He said that when you double the capacity for a total of 8,390, you are doubling the amount of
<br />rods that are to be moved, and doubling the risk of an accident. He explained that the reason CP&L and
<br />the NRC claims the risk of accidents do not double, is that they claim they are using the same equipment
<br />and procedures that are now being used. He emphasized how wrong the UCS thought this was.
<br />The second concern is that the alternative plan is totally inadequate. He explained that
<br />the application does not indicate what they have done to be sure the equipment, which has been sitting
<br />since 1983, still will operate sufficiently and has not deteriorated. After 1983, the NRC sent a letter to all
<br />nuclear plant owners, telling them to watch out for systems that sit for more than one year, because the
<br />system deteriorates. The plant that got into this trouble, that led to the NRC telling all the other plants in
<br />the country, was one of CP&L's plant, the Robinson plant. This seems to be a loophole. If it has
<br />deteriorated, it could increase the chances of an accident.
<br />The third concern is that they have not sufficiently analyzed what they would do in case
<br />of a power loss. In CP&L's application, they indicated that if they lose power they could use their backup
<br />power system that they have in place for A & B pools. The application does not say whether they will still
<br />be able to cool the reactor. They need to assure the public that they can do both.
<br />The fourth concern is the potential for a new accident. CP&L claims that the only
<br />accident that could occur would be a drop of a rack module during construction activity. The application
<br />explains what they would do if that did occur, and that it is not a threat to the workers or the public. Mr.
<br />Lochbaum said that there is another accident that could occur. Once they put in Pools C and D, more
<br />spent fuel assemblies are put into the pools, risking a failure of the cooling equipment. The last concern,
<br />which doesn't concern CP&L so much as it does the NRC, is the Waste Confidence Decision. This says
<br />that spent fuel can be stored at nuclear power plants until they provide another deposit site. One of the
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