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34 <br />Nuclear Wasie Disposal Crisis <br />(V[av 1988: The refueling cavity water seal at Sorry Unit 1 failed with the <br />reactor core fully offloaded into the spent fuel pool. The leakage dropped the SFP <br />level about three feet.` <br />October 1988: The air supply line to the inflatable seal on the transfer canal <br />dour at Sorry Unit 1 experienced a pinhole leak that was quickly detected and <br />repaired. At the time, the fuel transfer canal was drained, the fuel transfer tube <br />was open with the blind flange removed on the containment side and the gate <br />valve open on the spent fuel pool side for testing in preparation for an upcoming <br />refueling outage. Virginia Power determined that the spent fuel pool could have <br />been drained to within 13 inches of the top of irradiated fuel assemblies in the <br />storage racks. The radiation field on the refueling floor was estimated at 50 <br />Rem/hr in that condition. If this postulated event occurred shortly after refueling <br />instead of just prior to refueling, the radiation field would have been significant- <br />ly higher.° <br />Loss of Fue! Pool Cooling <br />January 19Ti: A power interruption lasting two hours shut down the cool- <br />ing pump for the spent fuel pool at General Electric's Midwest Fuel Recovery <br />Plant. The outside temperature ~.•as -19°F at the time. When the power was <br />restored, it was quickly discovered that a pipe in the cooling system had Frozen <br />and ruptured. The cooling system remained shut down for several weeks ~~•hile <br />the piping vas repaired. Decay heat from the irradiated fuel assemblies heated <br />the pool to an equilibrium temperature of 115'F. The humidity in the building <br />rose to an uncomfortable level, but otherwise this incident had nu adverse impact <br />on either plant personnel or the general public. <br />tV[av 199?: A spent fuel pool cooling system failure at Comanche Peak Unit <br />1 went undetected for 17 hour until the VRC Resident Inspector noted discrep- <br />ancies behn~een log entries and control room indicators. Both Unit 1 spent fuel <br />pool cooling trains were discovered to be inoperable. Texas l-'tilitn~~ ~~iectnc <br />Company had to use touting water from the unfinished and untested l_ nit . to <br />cowl the Unit 1 spent fuel pool.' <br />June 1993: Cooling water to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger at South <br />Texas Unit 2 vas inadvertently lost. This event remained undetected fur 13 hours <br />during a refueling outage with the reactor core fully off-loaded into the spent fuel <br />pool. During the transfer of electrical power buses for maintenance activities, the <br />component cooling water (CCW) system momentarily experienced a spurious <br />surge tank low level signal. The signal closed the CCW supply an~i return ~~alves <br />to the spent fuel pool heat zxchangers. The fuel pool cooling s~•~tem pu~;~p, c~n- <br />tinued to dreulate ~~'ater through the heat exchangers altliuugh nu heat removal <br />~.a: rccurrin~ The SFP heated up from 99°F to 115'F during the 1? h~~ur~ <br />October lyu ~. Cooling ~.ater to the spent fuel pool heat r~~h.u~:;er~ at Farley <br />1. nit ? was mistakenly' uulated fur three hours during a refueling vuta~;e ~~ nth the <br />160 <br />