Orange County NC Website
12 <br />Chapter Eight • Spent Fuel Rtsks <br />Loss of Water Inventory <br />The principal spent fuel accident concern is losing spent fuel pool ~.•ater end <br />the capability to caul the irradiated fuel assemblies. [f the spent fuel pool drams, <br />the spent fuel assemblies discharged within the past three to four veirti ,till pr~- <br />duce sufficient decay heat to cause meltdown. in addihun, the htel'~ cla~idin <br />could initiate and sustain rapid oxidation (often referred to as "fire' uut~id~~ the <br />nuclear power industry) during heatup prior to melting. The resultiti, .la~idin~ <br />fire in a spent fuel pool equipped with high-density storage rark~ ruul~i :pre~d <br />to every spent fuel assembly. <br />The probability that the cladding would catch urrfire after the spent fuel <br />pool completely drains has been estimated at 100~'~ for PWRs and 2~=.'. fur B~~'Ps.' <br />The BWR probability is significantly lower because it was assumed that tl~e BtVR <br />spent fuel assemblies are stored with their fuel channels in place, thus acting as <br />barriers preventing the fire from spreading. Storing BWR spent fuel assemblies <br />kith the fuel channels in place significantly reduces spent fuel risk, vet the SRC <br />dues nut require or even recommend that BWR plants implement thu ine~pen- <br />sive safety precaution. <br />The loss of spent fuel pool water inventory e~•ent has the potential fur c~nt- <br />aminating the environment tivorse than would occur from a reactor core accident <br />due to the significantly la der quantity of radioactive material a. ~ilable fur <br />release.' Additionally, the loss of spent foe! pool ~.•ater im•entun• r~•~•nt i~ inher- <br />ently worse than the reactor cure accident because the fuel d.ima~__• ,utd radiuar- <br />tivity release urcvr outside the major barrier protecting the pubic,. the prtman~ <br />containment. Therefore, it is mute likely that radioactive material r~•lriwd in a <br />spent fuel pool accident would reach the environment. <br />Several failure mules causing spent fuel puuTweter in~•enturv to be lust <br />were considered during the design process. The predominant fai!t;r,: [nude is <br />structural integrity damage that drains the spent fuel pool ~.•ater at ,t r,~te e~ceed- <br />ing makeup capability. The events producing this failure mo~i~ , r!• <br />quakes, heavy loads dropping into the pouf ur onto its wall, and ti: . <br />ed missiles. The secondary failure mule im•olves fuel pool cuolin warm mil- <br />htnrhuns enabling accelerated water loss from the pool. Thy e.•ent> prudurin <br />this failure mule include a fuel pool cooling system pipe break and a failure of <br />the system's heat removal function. Another failure mud e, typically nut run~id- <br />ered dunng the design process but pru~•ing to be rather troublesome nonetheless. <br />in~•ul~•es sell failure that allu..-s water to leak from the pool into ,t~ii,t:eni .tr~a, <br />Sorb as the containment, the shipping cask pit, and the fuel tran.t~ r tuh~~ <br />The spent Fuel pools at nuclear power plants to the t_ rit~•~1 ~t.lte•. are <br />de~t~ned to withstand earthquakes without loss ut inte~rtt~' Thy \l:C ~~. ,~lu.tted <br />the spent fuel pooh at the ~'ermunt Yankee an~i the H. B R~~i•r•~~m hl,tnt~ t., <br />~irt~•rnunr thetr.ulnerabilit~' to earthquakes more ~r.•ert~ thin ~~•~•.;,I~~r~•.i .lurut <br />~i~~~i~n Th~•~~ runrludrd that the spenc fuel pool, ~.~ouid prol~,ti~l~ •ur. n u .ut <br />