Agenda - 01-21-2010 - 3b - Laserfiche WebLink

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24 RECOMMENDATIONS I. ICE must reinforce its commitment to prioritize those immigrants who have been convicted of egregious felony offenses, or who truly pose a threat to the community, by issuing strict guidelines that include: • Secure Communities should not be focused on individuals convicted of non - felony offenses. • Secure Communities screening should take place upon conviction, not during the pre - conviction stage. 2. DHS should clarify that an immigration detainer is not the equivalent of a criminal arrest warrant or criminal detainer, and is simply a non - mandatory request that police maintain custody of an individual for a maximum of 48 hours to facilitate DHS's picking that person up. DHS should clarify that the local jail is not authorized to detain the subject for a period exceeding 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. ICE should be required to issue reports to Congress on a regular basis, with statistics on the crimes for which identified non - citizens are arrested, the disposition of each underlying criminal case, and the nationality and ethnicity of identified non - citizens. Jurisdictions participating in Secure Communities should be required to report their arrest and identification statistics to ICE supervisors for oversight and management purposes. 4. Congress should request that the GAO or another neutral agency conduct an audit of the Secure Communities program. The report should contain an assessment of Secure Communities goals and objectives, performance measures, supervision and oversight, data tracking, and reporting mechanisms. It is important that officials overseeing the Secure Communities program review the GAO report on 287(g) and make every effort to ensure that this vast new national program be properly defined, documented, evaluated, and supervised. Given the documented shortcomings of the 287(g) and CAP programs, mechanisms should be put into place on the front end, and not delayed until another damaging report is issued on the failures of Secure Communities. 5. The public should receive consistent information about the operation of Secure Communities. Public outreach, community meetings, and information - sharing should be a central element of program implementation. 6. Alf jurisdictions participating in Secure Communities should receive training on civil rights and illegal racial or other profiling. 7. DHS must create and implement a strong complaint and redress mechanism for individuals who believe they have been wrongly arrested, detained, or otherwise mistreated under the Secure Communities program. 8. Before expanding Secure Communities to a jurisdiction, DHS should consider the direct and indirect effects that the program could have on public safety and community policing in that jurisdiction. Secure Communities should also ensure that any jurisdiction has the option to refuse to participate in the program, and that local authorities be given instructions for opting out. 15