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Agenda - 02-02-1999 - 9e1
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Agenda - 02-02-1999 - 9e1
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BOCC
Date
2/2/1999
Meeting Type
Regular Meeting
Document Type
Agenda
Agenda Item
9e-1
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Minutes - 19990202
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10 <br />the entire period of the Harris operating license, will double if pools C and D are <br />activated. If integrated over .the remaining period of the operating license, the probability <br />will more than double. <br />42. The PWR racks in pools C and D will be safe against criticality for a compazatively <br />narrow range of fuel enrichment and burnup. Thus, assuming that the general nature of <br />fuel-movement continues as before, the probability of a criticality accident will be <br />significantly increased if pools C and D are activated. This probability will increase on a <br />per-movement basis, so it will more than double when integrated over the entire period of <br />the Harris operating license. The consequences of a criticality accident may also be <br />significantly increased. <br />43. Activation of pools C and D will add to the electrical load and CCW heat load of <br />existing Harris systems. It will also add to the burden of work on the Harris operators. <br />These effects will increase the probability of two categories of design-basis or severe <br />accidents. First, they will sigmficantly increase the probability of accidents associated <br />with the Harris reactor, because the reactor's CCW and electrical systems and its <br />operators will be under greater stress. Second, they will significantly increase the <br />probability of accidents at the Harris pools that are attributable to interruptions in cooling <br />and electricity supply and to increased operator stress. Also, the inability of cooling <br />piping at pools C and D to meet ASME code requirements could significantly increase <br />the probability of design-basis or severe accidents at these pools. <br />44. As mentioned in paragraph 24 above, to my knowledge there has been no site-specific <br />analysis of severe accidents affecting any of the Harris pools. To the extent that such <br />accidents have been previously evaluated, their consequences will be significantly <br />increased by the activation of pools C and D. The fuel storage capacity of these pools <br />will roughly double the storage capacity at Harris, creating the potential for a doubled <br />inventory of radioactivity. Severe accidents could affect some or all of the Harris pools. <br />As I have discussed in pazagraph 30 above, the potential doubling of radioactivity in the <br />pools could significantly increase the consequences of severe accidents. <br />J. Possibility of New or Different Kinds of Accident from any Accident Previously <br />Evaluated <br />45. To my knowledge, there has been no site-specific evaluation of the probability or <br />consequences of severe accidents at pools A and B at Harris. A variety of severe <br />accidents are possible and should be subjected to the kind of systematic analysis that is <br />performed in an IPE and IPEEE. The NRC has performed evaluations of accidents <br />involving loss of water from fuel pools, generically and for sites other than Harris. <br />However, these evaluations are seriously deficient because they failed to consider partial <br />uncovering of fuel. To summarize, at pools A and B there exists the possibility of new or <br />different kinds of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The same possibility <br />will exist at pools C and D if these are activated. <br />46. Provision of electrical power and CCW service from the existing Harris plant to <br />pools C and D could introduce the potential for design-basis or severe accidents that aze <br />new or different from any accident previously considered. The IPE and IPEEE studies <br />performed for Harris did not address the provision of electrical power and CCW service <br />to pools C and D. As an example of the potential for new or different accidents, the need <br />to provide cooling to pools C and D will place increased stress on the CCW system and <br />the plant operators during adesign-basis LOCA. <br />
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