Orange County NC Website
02i16i99 09:45 HARMON.CURRAN.5P1 ~ 919 644 0246 N0.093 D05 <br />-4- <br />"no significant hazards considerations: ' The NRC standard for making a No Significant Hazards <br />determination is found in l0 C.F.R. § 50.92, which provides that the NRC may make find that a <br />license amendment poses no significant hazards considerations if it would not: <br />(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident <br />previously evaluated; <br />(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident <br />previously evaluated; or <br />(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. <br />As discussed in the attached Declaration of Dr. Gordon Thompson, none. of these criteria is <br />satisfied by the proposed license amendment. <br />A. Tate Staff Fails to Show That the Operation of the Facility In Accordance With the <br />Proposed License Amendment Would Not Involve a Significant lacrense ie the <br />Probability or Consequences of an Accident Prtvionsly Evaluated. <br />In the Federal Register notice, the Staff concludes that operation of the Harris facility in <br />accordance with the proposed license amendment would not involve a significant increase in the <br />probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. As discussed in the Thompson <br />Declaration, this claim is false, for several reasons. Activation of pools C and D will roughly <br />double the total number of fuel handling operations to be conducted at Hams. Assuming that the <br />general nature of fuel handling operations continues as before, the probability of a fuel assembly <br />drop or misloaded fuel assembly, integrated over the entire period of the Harris operating license, <br />will increase significantly, by a factor of two. If probability is integrated over the remaining <br />period of the Harris operating license, rather than over its total duration, then activation of pools <br />C and D will more than double the probability of a fuel assembly drop or a misloaded fuel <br />assembly. The probability of a criticality accident will also be more than doubled, and the <br />consequences of a criticality accident may also be significantly increased. Thompson <br />Declaration, par. 42. <br />