Agenda - 04-07-1999 - Laserfiche WebLink

Browse Search

UCS Concerns about Harris Spent Fuel Pool Plans Incompletely Analysed Consequences of Previously Evaluated Accidents In the second paragraph on page 5-3 of Enclosure 7 to Serial: HNP-98-188, "Licensing Report for Expanding Storage Capacity in Harris Spent Fuel Pools `C' and' `D' (Non-Proprietary Version)," Holtec reported: Consequently, all of the decay heat generated in the C and D pools is considered to be removed by the forced flow of SFP cooling water circulating through a heat exchanger, which transfers heat to the CCW system. On page 9.1.3-6 of the Harris Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Section 9.1.3.3, "Safety Evaluation for the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Amend. No. 48), CP&L stated: If a total loss of offsite power should occur, the operator has the option of transferring~the [fuel pool cooling] pumps to the emergency power source. In other words, the fuel pool cooling pumps are powered from the plant's normal electrical supplies, but they can be re-aligned to be supplied from emergency power sources (e.g., the diesel generators). In the middle paragaph on page 4 of Enclosure 2 to Serial: IINP-98-188, "IOCFR50.92 Evaluation Significant Hazards Consideration," CP&L stated: Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at Harris is mitigated in the usual manner by ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss of forced cooling and uncovering fuel.... Evaluation of this accident usually includes determination of a time to boil, which in the case of pools `C' and `D' is in excess of 13 hours based in a consideration of end of plant life heat loads. The documentation submitted by CP&L in support of this license amendment request addressed the impact of the increased heat load from Pools C and D on the fuel pool cooling, component cooling water, and residual heat removal systems, but did not address the impact on the emergency power source. Per its licensing bases, the Harris Nuclear Plant must be able to handle a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and station blackout (SBO) without undue risk to the public. In the event of an extended loss of the normal potiver supply system, plant operators would have to transfer the fuel pool cooling pumps to be supplied from the emergency power source (i.e., the offite diesel generators). According to the time-to-boil information provided by CP&L, this transfer may be required within 13 hours after the loss of normal power supply. Yet, the analyses submitted by CP&L do not address whether the diesel generators have sufficient margin to handle this increased load. Therefore, CP&L failed to completely evaluated the potential consequences of the proposed activity on previously analyzed accidents. 04/05/99 Page 2